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Notes
The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the

NLRB as a Limitation on the
Application of RICO to Labor
Disputes
INTRODUCTION

In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act'

(NLRA), a statutory scheme designed to facilitate industrial
peace. 2 The NLRA created certain rights and duties pertaining

to employees, employers and labor organizations in the collective
bargaining process, 3 and established the remedies available for
4
violations of such rights.
The NLRA also established the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), a quasi-judicial administrative agency whose
purpose is to decide what conduct violates the NLRA and to
provide an appropriate remedy 5 The NLRB's jurisdiction under
See 29 U.S.C §§ 151-169 (1982).
2 R. GoRmAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 1 (1976).

The basic principle of the NLRA is to be found in its section 7,
granting to employees the right to form labor organizations, to deal collectively through such organizations regarding terms and conditions of
employment and to engage in concerted activities in support of these other
rights. The statute can best be understood as an effort by the Congress to
create the conditions of industrial peace in interstate commerce by removing
obstacles to-indeed, encouraging-the formation of labor unions as an
effective voice for the individual worker.
Id.
, See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982).
4 Examples of remedies available to the NLRB are (1) cease and desist orders; (2)
employee reinstatement; and (3) back pay awards. Id. at § 160(c). See infra notes 41-46
and accompanying text.
See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982) (establishing the NLRB); 1d. at § 160 (empowers
NLRB to prevent violations of the NLRA and provides for remedies).
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the Act is exclusive. Thus, any "unfair labor practice' '6 charge
may be resolved only by the NLRB. 7 This exclusive jurisdiction
preempts the states' authority to regulate conduct arguably controlled by the NLRA. s
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)9 to strengthen the hand of
the federal government in combatting organized crime. 10 RICO

provides both criminal sanctions" and a civil remedy for private
plaintiffs whose businesses or property are injured by violations
of the statute.'"
While these two federal statutory schemes are virtually in-

6 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982) lists unfair labor practices. Unfair labor practices may
be committed by employers (§ 158(a)) as well as unions (§ 158(b)). For example, both
employers and unions are prohibited from interfering with or restraining employees in
the exercise of their § 157 nghts. Id. at § 158(a)(1), (b)(1).
I See id. at § 160(a); Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison, 309
U.S. 261 (1940) (The original codification of this section made this exclusivity express.
However, after certain amendments contained in the LMRA provided for federal district
court jurisdiction over specified causes of action, the word "exclusive" was deleted.
Nonetheless, recognizing congressional intent, courts have consistently upheld this exclusive jurisdiction.). See, e.g., Butcher's Union v. SDC Inv., Inc., 631 F Supp, 1001,
1006 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (explaining the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over unfair
labor practice disputes).
There are two exceptions to the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction. See 29 U.S.C. §§
186-187. (Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 302 provides jurisdiction to
federal courts to hear complaints that involve illegal payments made to union representatives by employers. LMRA § 303 makes § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA (which prohibits
secondary boycotts, recognition and work assignment strikes) remediable in federal
district court. LMRA § 303 was designed to deter unions from conduct that Congress
deemed particularly objectionable by subjecting the unions to monetary damages. See
also R. GoRmAN, supra note 2, at 291.
8 See infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982); see also infra notes 70-97 and accompanying
text.
See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
923 (1970).
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering
process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.
Id.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) provides for fines up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment
for up to 20 years.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides treble damages for any person proving an
injury to business or property by reason of a violation of the act.
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dependent of each other, 13 certain conduct by employers or labor
organizations may fall within the proscriptions of both the NLRA
and RICO 14 Because the NLRA places unfair labor practices
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, the question arises
whether Congress intended RICO to apply to such labor-management conflicts. 5
Resolution of the potential conflict between the NLRB's
exclusive jurisdiction to remedy labor disputes and RICO's generic, all-encompassing applicability requires thoughtful application of each statute to the facts of a given dispute. The
congressional intent behind each of these two statutes should
not be thwarted by the application of the other As this Note
will demonstrate, reconciliation requires ascertaining the type of
injury the plaintiff has allegedly incurred and then focusing on
the defendant's conduct to determine whether the NLRA or
RICO provides the appropriate remedy To perform this analysis, the rights and remedies provided by each of the statutes will
be explored.
I.

A.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Background of the NLRA

Prior to the enactment of the NLRA, i 6 the courts treated
concerted activities by employees seeking increased wages or
improved working conditions with hostility 17 During the 19th
century, for example, such activities were sometimes deemed
13See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(c) (1982). "RICO" includes as one of its "predicate
acts" a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982) (LMRA § 302), which deals with restrictions
on loans and payments to labor organizations. For a discussion of the relevance of this
small interrelationship, see infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., infra notes 156-77 and accompanying text (A deprivation of property
or contractual rights provided by a collective bargaining agreement may constitute both
unfair labor practices under the NLRA and a Pattern of Racketeering Activity under
RICO.).
" See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text (discussing the balance between
federal and state regulation of labor-management conflicts); see also infra notes 170-96
and accompanying text (discussing whether RICO should be interpreted as an implied
repeal of the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over labor-management disputes).
16The NLRA is a complicated federal statutory scheme. The contents of this
section purport to be only a broad overview of the provisions relevant to the broader
statutory comparison of the NLRA and RICO.
'1 See R. Go.mAN, supra note 2, at 1-3.
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criminal conspiracies which restrained trade and damaged employers.' 8 Concerted employee activities were often enjoined by
federal courts pursuant to anti-trust laws.1 9
Congressional recognition of judicial hostility to the interests
of laborers prompted the passage of section 20 of the Clayton
Act of 1914.20 Section 20 placed certain concerted activities
outside the reach of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 2' by making
them nonenjoinable by the courts. 22 Later, following the Supreme Court's narrow construction of section 20, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which protected the employees'
right to strike and provided additional guarantees of fairness to
laborersY
While the Norris-LaGuardia Act limited the federal government's ability to inhibit employees seeking collective bargaimng
concessions, Congress subsequently enacted additional legislation
to protect employees' rights to self-orgamzation. 24 In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), also
known as the "Wagner Act." 2 This statute, as amended, 26 is

11 Id. at 1.
19See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). In Loewe, the United Hatters
of North America, in attempting to uniomze a hat manufacturer, organized a strike and
a boycott of the manufacturer's hats. The Court found this to violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act as an obstruction of the free flow of commerce and a restriction of a
trader's ability to engage in business. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
20 R. GoRmAN,supra note 2, at 3-4; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 17, 26 (1982); 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1982) (prohibiting injunctions that restrained members of labor organizations from
ceasing to perform work).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The Sherman Act was intended to prevent conspiracies
in restraint of commerce and made such conspiracies illegal.
2 See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 472 (1921) (The Court
strictly construed § 20 of the Clayton Act, which forbids injunctions against conduct
growing out of a dispute over terms of employment. The Act was held to cover only
specific employees' grievances, and not union conduct in which no specific industrial
controversy exists.). Id.
- See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). The act recognized the employees' need to
bargain collectively with management and provided strict procedures for courts to follow
before enjoining any employee collective behavior.
14See id. at § 151 (statement of findings and policies behind enactment of NLRA).
21 Id. at §§ 151-68. See B. ScHwARTz & R. KoRETz, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION 267-310 (1970).
6 The NLRA has been amended by both the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982), and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982). From this point forward, all references to the NLRA will
refer to the NLRA, as amended, i.e., its present form.
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the framework for today's federal labor law
B.

27

Unfair Labor Practices

The NLRA regulates "employers'"' who operate businesses
affecting interstate commerce. 2 9 "Employees" covered under the
Act include all persons working for such employers, except those
specifically excluded by the Act.30 These statutory "employers"
and "employees" are subject to the rights and duties contained
in the NLRA and their conduct must conform to its provisions.
The rights of employees under the NLRA are enumerated in
section 7 of the Act. 3' For instance, under that section, employees have the right to bargain collectively 32 Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act makes it an "unfair labor practice" for an employer to
violate these employee rights. 33 Section 8(a) also proscribes other

27 For a brief summary of the development of federal labor law, see R. Goi.MA,
supra note 2, at 1-6.
21 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or
any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank,
or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the
or any labor organization (other than when acting
Railway Labor Act
as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of
such labor organization.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1982) defines "commerce" as "trade
among the several
P
States.
- 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) excludes agricultural laborers, domestic servants,
individuals employed by their parents or spouses, independent contractors, supervisors
and those employed by persons not recognized as employers by the NLRA.
11Id. at § 157.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaimng or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an argeement requiring memberslup in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in section 158(a)(3) of this title [NLRA § 8(a)(3)].
ld.
Id.
33 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982) provides: "[ult shall be an unfair labor practice for
32

to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
an employer
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [NLRA § 7]."
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types of conduct by employers.Y For example, Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act forces employers to bargain in good faith with the
collective bargaining agent of their employees.3 5
As originally codified, the NLRA regulated only employers'
behavior 36 However, the Labor Management Relations Act
- See id. at § 158(a)(2)-(5).
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor orgamzation or contribute financial or other support to it:
Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 156 of this title [NLRA § 6], an employer shall
not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him dunng
working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer
from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established,
maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection [NLRA §
8(a)] as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the begimmng
of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is
the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees
as provided in section 159(a) of this title [NLRA § 9(a)], in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii)
unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title
[NLRA § 9(e)] within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority
of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Providedfurther
That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for
nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on
same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B)
if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was demed or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaimng membership;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title [NLRA
§ 9(a)].
Id. (partial emphasis added); see also B. ScHwAITz & R. KoanrZ, supra note 25, at
288-94 (discussion of policies behind the enactment of NLRA § 8(a)).
35 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
36 See B. ScHwA Tz & R. KorETz, supra note 25, at 297 (Congress felt no showing
had been made that employers needed protection in dealing with employees.).
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(LMRA) 37 added section 8(b) to the NLRA, which provided a
list of "unfair labor practices" applicable to collective bargaining agents. 38 Thus, the NLRA now regulates both employers and
unions in the collective bargaining process by preventing either
from acting in derogation of employees' rights under the Act.
C. Remedying Unfair Labor Practices
Section 3 of the NLRA establishes the National Labor Re-

lations Board (NLRB), 39 which is charged with the responsibility
of administering the Act.40 Section 10 of the NLRA contains the

procedural framework by which the NLRB remedies unfair labor
41
practices .

Upon receiving an unfair labor practice charge 42 from either
an employer or a union, the General Counsel 43 of the NLRB

has the power to issue an unfair labor practice complaint"
against the charged party The General Counsel's decision concermng the issuance of complaints is non-reviewable by either

the NLRB or the courts, except for cases in which there is a
claim of arbitrariness or bad faith on the part of the Board. 45
Once a complaint is issued, the NLRB will determine whether

31 The Labor Management Relations Act includes 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-158,
159-169, 171-183, 185-187, 191-197. 29 U.S.C. § 141(a) (short title).
11B. ScswARTz & R. KoaR=z, supra note 25, at 562 (Congress felt that union
practices, including some forms of labor strikes and boycotts, had become sufficiently
damaging to the public to merit some federal regulation.).
39 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)-(b).
40 See id. at §§ 159-60. The NLRB is charged with policing the conduct of union
representation elections and remedying unfair labor practices. This discussion only pertains to the latter.
4' Id.
at § 160 (prevention of Unfair Labor Practices).
42 R. GoaMAN, supra note 2, at 7 ("An unfair labor practice case is initiated by
filing a charge in the regional office [of the NLRB] where the alleged wrongdoing has
occurred.").
.3 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982). The General Counsel of the Board is appointed
by the President and has final authority over the investigation and prosecution of all
complaints received by, and charges issued by the Board.
" See itd. at § 160(b). The Board or any designated agent or agency of the Board
has the power to issue a complaint which states the charges and contains a notice of
heanng.
41 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The Court held that if the Board's
decision not to take the gnevance to arbitration was not arbitrary or made in bad faith,
the decision was unreviewable.
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the conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice, and if so, the
appropriate remedy 46
D The Balance of Federal and State Regulation of LaborManagement Conflicts
Although Congress created the NLRB as an exclusive, expert

administrative body to develop national labor law policy,4 7

it

48
omitted criminal sanctions and civil remedies from the NLRA.

The Act was not intended to remedy violence or fraud by employers or unions. 49 Existing state law definitions of criminal
conduct were deemed sufficient to regulate the behavior of em-

ployers and unions.50
The NLRA's thrust is remedial rather than punitive, as dem-

onstrated by the means provided to the NLRB to remedy unfair

labor practices. 51 These "make whole" remedies include cease

and desist orders, reinstatement orders and orders requiring payment of back pay to wrongfully terminated employees. 52 While
the NLRB cannot directly enforce these remedies, any court of

appeals of the United States may order compliance with the
Board's order -1

- See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
47 See R. GoRmAN, supra note 2, at 291; see, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffers
and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies.
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite
as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different
rules of substantive law.
Id., see infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
49 See B. ScHwARTz & R. KoRETz, supra note 25, at 298 (state law regulation of
crimes and torts deemed sufficient); see also A. GOLDMAN, LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 98 (1979).
-1 See B. SciwARTz & R. KORETZ, supra note 25, at 298; cf. A. GOLDMAN, supra
note 49, at 754 (Actions in state courts to remedy violence and other torts are available
if the state remedy does not conflict with federal labor policy.).
1, See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
12See id. at § 160(c).
11See id. at § 160(e).
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Recognizing the delicate balance between federal and state
54
regulation of conflicts occurring in labor-management disputes
courts have applied the "preemption doctrine" to draw the line
between appropriate federal and state jurisdiction and remedies.15 Under the preemption doctrine, as applied to the labor
law context, states may not regulate conduct that is either pro56
tected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA.
For example, a state has no jurisdiction to award an employer
damages arising out of picketing by employees.5 7 As the Court
5
stated in San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon 8
"[w]hen the exercise of state power over a particular area of
activity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy
of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude
59
the States from acting."
In recognition of the balance of federalism contemplated by
Congress, states are prohibited from regulating labor activities
that are neither prohibited nor protected by the NLRA, but
represent conduct Congress intended to leave available to em-

ployers and unions as economic weapons

0

For example, in

InternationalAssociation of Machinists v Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,61 a union pressured an employer by
having its members refuse overtime work.6 2 This activity was
neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA. 63 The employer

filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, but it was

14See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (In order for federal regulation
of unfair labor practies to be uniform, individual states must not make laws that impact
on the same subject matter as the NLRA.).
" See BLACK's LAw DicioNAY 1060 (5th ed. 1979) (Certain federal laws preempt
or take precedence over certain state laws.).
56 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The
Court prohibited the state from awarding damages to employers for economic injuries
resulting from the peaceful picketing of their plants by unauthorized labor unions. In
so doing, the Court stated that this activity was subject to the NLRA, and therefore the
states must defer to the NLRA in these matters. Id.
'

Id.

359 U.S. 236 (1959).
' Id.
at 243.
0 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
61427 U.S. 132 (1976).
61 Id. at 134.
" Id.
at 135.
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dismissed by the NLRB Regional Director Consequently, the
employer sought and received relief from the state labor board 4
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the state's action, holding that Congress intended some conduct "to be controlled by
the free play of economic forces.' '65
States, however, may exercise legitimate control over some
conflicts arising in the labor law context. First, the application
of state criminal sanctions is not preempted by the NLRA when
employers or unions violate state criminal statutes. 66 Also, state
tort remedies are available to those individuals damaged by
tortious conduct.67 In other words, the NLRA has not been
construed to prevent the states from regulating "conduct
touch[ing] interests
deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility" 68 or in which the "activity regulated [is] a merely
peripheral concern" under the NLRA. 69
II.

A.

RACKETEERING-INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS

Overview of History and Purpose of RICO

RICO70 was enacted in 1970 as Title IX of the Orgamzed
Crime Control Act (OCCA).7 1 As its title suggests, the Act was
designed to combat the pervasive influence of organized crime.7 2
Congress was especially concerned about the harmful effects to
the national economy caused by the infiltration and control of
legitimate businesses and labor organizations by orgamzed crime. 73

6 Id. at 135-36.
11 Id. at 144.
6 See R. GoRmAN, supra note 2, at 216 (perpetrator of a state-law cnme not

immunized from criminal liability merely because conduct occurs in the context of a
labor dispute).
67 See U.A.W -C.I.O. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (individual prevented from
working because of threats of violence by union pickets entitled to common-law tort
action in state court); see also Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
6 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 359 U.S. at 244.

Id. at 243.
70 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Orgamzations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-

1968 (1982).
7 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
72 See supra note 10.
7, See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969); see also 116 CONG. REc.
575, 591-92 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMi N. NEws 1073, 1095-96.
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While the overriding purpose of the legislation is abundantly
clear from its title and history, Congress did not necessarily
intend to limit RICO's application to organized crime. 74
The OCCA, including RICO, passed the Senate almost unanimously on January 23, 1970."s The bill was referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary on January 26, 1970.76 The
House passed the bill in 1970, 7 7 but not before adding a private
right of action for persons injured by RICO-type conduct. 78 The
Senate viewed the House amendments to the bill as minor and
adopted them by voice vote and without a conference. 79 The
legislation was signed into law by President Nixon on October
15, 1970.80
B. RICO: CriminalProhibitionof Racketeering
Title IX of the OCCA, commonly known as "RICO," prohibits: (1) any person from investing income obtained from a
pattern of racketeering activity into enterprises operating in interstate commerce, 8 ' (2) any person from obtaining an interest
in an enterprise operating in interstate commerce through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful
debt,8 2 and (3) any person from conducting an enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity 83
A " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
[Oct. 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years

1' See 116 CoNG. Rac. 18,913-14 (Senator McClellan, the author of S.30, the bill
which became the OCCA, made it clear that the act should not necessarily be limited in
application to organized crime.).
71 Id. at 952, 972 (The vote was 73 to 1.).
16 Id. at 1103.
77 Id. at 35,363.
7'See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). "Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
See 116 CONG. Rac. at 36,280-96.
1oId. at 37,264.
"118 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
Id. at § 1962(b).
11Id. at § 1962(c).
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(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of
a prior act of racketeering activity "84 "Racketeering Activities"

are numerous, including both state and federal crimes.8 5 These
crimes are known as "predicate acts.' '86 Conspiring to violate
87
RICO is also proscribed by the Act.

14 See id. at § 1961(5); see also Comment, The PatternRequirement of Civil RICO,
74 KY. L.J. 623 (1985-86).
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1986) provides as follows:
(1) '[R]acketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by impnsonment for more than
one year, (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title i8, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery),
section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472 and 473 (relating
to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment)
if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating
to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section
1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating
to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating
to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling
businesses), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of
stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain
motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to
trafficking in contraband cigarettes), section 2421-24 (relating to white slave
traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code,
section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor
organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union
funds), (D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E)any act which
is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
Id.
86In other words, the violations of other substantive laws are the acts upon which
the substantive RICO violation is predicated. For the-purpose of tlus Note, at least, it
is important to remember that the predicate acts are independent crimes which are
subject to traditional prosecution. The crime of "RICO" is the use of the proscribed
conduct in a pattern and constitutes a separate offense.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Supp. 1982).
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The criminal penalties for violating RICO include both fines
and imprisonment.8 8 The Act also provides for forfeiture of any

interest acquired in violation of the statute.

9

C. The Civil Remedy For RICO Violations
The application of the RICO statute is not limited to criminal
prosecution by the United States. 9° Specifically, any person in-

- 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1986) provides:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter [18
USCS § 1962] shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States,
irrespective of any provision of State law(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962 [18 USCS § 1962];
(2) any(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against, or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source
of influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of
section 1962 [18 USCS § 1962]; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or
unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962 [18 USCS § 1962].
The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in
addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that
the person forfeit to the United States all property described in this
subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a
defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may
be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.
Id.
89Id.
91 Id. at § 1964(a).
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS § 1962]
by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any
person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise;
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of
any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorgamzation of any enterprise, making due provision for the
rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section.

214
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jured in his business or property due to RICO-type conduct may
bring suit in a federal district court for treble damages, costs
and reasonable attorney's fees. 91 Thus, the statute's broad reach
is not necessarily limited by the prosecutorial discretion of the
United States Department of Justice. 92
The "civil RICO Action" has flourished during the last five
years93 as lawyers have become more aware of the substantial
remedies available under the statute. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's first pronouncement on civil RICO, Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v Imrex Company, Inc.,94 "fueled the fire" by eliminating two
defenses upon which civil RICO defendants had previously relied
to persuade lower courts to dismiss civil RICO claims. First, the
Court held that it is not necessary for a defendant to have been
convicted of a predicate act for a civil RICO clain to exist. 95
Second, the Court struck down the Second Circuit's requirement
that the plaintiff's injury must have arisen from a RICO-type
violation and not simply from one of the predicate acts.9 6 Thus,

Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS § 1962] may sue therefore in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in
any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter
[18 USC §§ 1961 et seq.] shall estop the defendant from denying the
essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
Id.
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
92See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3294 (1985) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
9'See Milner, A Civil RICO Bibliography, 21 C.W.L.R. 409 (1984-85) (listing of
cases, statutes and periodicals pertaining to Civil Rico).
105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
9i Justice White writing for a majority of five stated: "Had Congress intended to
impose [the requirement of a criminal conviction] there would have been at least some
mention of it in the legislative history, even if not in the statute." Id. at 3282.
See id. at 3285.
Given that 'racketeenng activity' consists of no more and no less than
commission of a predicate act, § 196(1), we are initially doubtful about a
requirement of a 'racketeering injury' separate from the harm from the
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the Court helped clear the path for civil litigants who might wish
to use "civil RICO" to redress injuries traditionally subject to
97
ordinary tort or fraud claims.
D.

The Potential Conflict Between RICO and the NLRA

Given the potential for the expansive application of both
crimnal and civil RICO, the question arises to what extent
Congress intended this statute to apply to labor-management
disputes. As discussed previously, Congress intended the NLRA
98
to be the exclusive remedial scheme for violations of the Act.
Thus, if employees are deprived of their NLRA rights by a
pattern of racketeering activity, should RICO, the NLRA, or
both statutes apply to such a violation?

In the criminal context, this potential for conflict may be
avoided to some extent by the Umted States attorney's use of
prosecutorial discretion.99 No such discretion exists, however, to
prevent employers, employees and unions from using a civil
RICO action to circumvent the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRB.'00 In Sedima, Justice Marshall discussed civil

predicate acts.
There is no room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous
'racketeering injury' requirement.
Id.
See id. at 3294-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In the context of civil RICO, however, the restraining influence of prosecutors is completely absent.
[P]nvate litigants have no reason to avoid
displacing state common-law remedies.
[I]n fact [they] have a strong
incentive to invoke RICO's provisions whenever they can allege in good
faith two instances of mail or wire fraud.
The civil RICO provision
consequently stretches the mall and wire fraud statutes to their absolute
limits and federalizes important areas of civil litigation that until now were
solely within the domain of the states.
Id. But see Comment, supra note 84, at 649 (The author of the Comment opines that
the "pattern requirement," 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), may be used to hold back the imminent
flood of civil litigation yet to come.).
See supra notes 6-8, 47 and accompanying text.
" See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Federal prosecutors
are
instructed that '[u]tilization of the RICO statute
requires particularly careful
and reasoned application. " Id. (quoting United States Attorney's Manual § 9-110.200
(March 9, 1984)),
" Because civil RICO is available to private plaintiffs, the U.S. Attorney's office
and its use of prosecutorial discretion is not impacted.
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RICO's potential encroachment into well-established federal remedial schemes:
In addition to altering fundamentally the federal-state balance
in civil remedies, the broad reading of the civil RICO provision
also displaces important areas of federal law For example,
one predicate offense under RICO is "fraud in the sale of
securities." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). By alleging two instances of
such fraud, a plaintiff might be able to bring a case within the
scope of the civil RICO provision. It does not take great legal
insight to realize that such a plaintiff would pursue his case
under RICO rather than do so solely under the Securities Act
of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provide
both express and implied causes of action for violations of the
federal securities laws.' 0'
Justice Marshall also recogmzed the potential for circumventing
other federal remedial schemes through the use of "civil RICO
actions alleging mail or wire fraud,"' 0 thus presaging the danger
civil RICO may pose to the integrity of the NLRA. By drafting
complaints to comply with civil RICO, private plaintiffs might
be able to obtain substantial relief in the form of treble damages,
costs and attorney's fees, which would not otherwise be available
under the NLRA for conduct which constitutes an unfair labor
practice under the Act.
III.
A.

RICO AND THE NLRA. WHEN SH oULD RICO APPLY9

Background: Federal Crime and the NLRA

Whether and to what extent federal criminal statutes should
apply to labor-management relations is not a new issue. In 1973,
the Supreme Court decided United States v Enmons,1i in which
the Hobbs Act' 4 was held inapplicable to legitimate labor dis-

101See Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3294-96.
101Id. at 3295.
M03
410 U.S. 396 (1973).

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or

104
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putes. 105 In Enmons, union employees of the Gulf States Utilities
Company were involved in a strike. Two union members were
indicted under the Hobbs Act for committing acts of physical
violence and destroying company property These acts of violence were allegedly committed to persuade the company to pay
higher wages.' 6
The government argued that acts of violence perpetrated to
obtain higher wages from an employer clearly constituted extortion. 107 "Extortion" is defined by the Hobbs Act as "the obtaimng of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear.

" 108

The Court held that the Hobbs Act did not apply in the
labor context when it would be impossible to determine if the
use of violence was "wrongful" without also having to decide
whether the goal of obtaining higher wages was "wrongful." 10 9
The Court stated: " 'wrongful' has meaning in the Hobbs Act
only if it limits the statute's coverage to those instances where
the obtaining of the property would itself be 'wrongful' because
the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that property "0
Because applying the Hobbs Act to labor violence would place
the federal government into the position of policing the conduct
of strikes, the Court deemed the language of the Hobbs Act
insufficient to work such a significant alteration of the federalstate balance of labor-management regulation.'
Implicit in the Court's decision was the intent to preserve
the regulatory scheme contained in the NLRA. Congress made
it clear that federal regulation of the labor-management process
would be limited to enforcing the rights and duties contained in

threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

Id.
JosEnmons, 401 U.S. at 396-99.
"0 Id. at 398. The acts of violence included firing rifles at company transformers,
draining oil from transformers and blowing up a transformer substation.
101Id. at 399.
lOS 18 U.S.C. § 1951(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
Enmons, 410 U.S. at 400.
110Id.
"I

Id. at 411.
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the NLRA, while the States would maintain their traditional
jurisdiction over criminal and tort law 112 Since Congress obviously has the ability to increase the federal government's role,
the Court held that such an intent must be clear from the
wording of the statute or legislative history 113 Therefore, the
Court was reluctant to interpret a subsequently enacted criminal
statute as expanding federal control of labor-management relations vis-a-vis the States.
One year after Enmons, the Second Circuit, in United States
v DeLaurentis, 14 was faced with deciding whether a federal
criminal statute that protected citizens from deprivations of federal rights should also include deprivations of rights provided
by the NLRA. 115 Specifically, the issue was whether 18 U.S.C.
section 241, an 1870 civil rights statute, could render violations
11 6
of the NLRA criminal.
Section 241 prohibits conspiracies to deprive a citizen of any
right secured to him by the laws of the United States. 117 Section
7 of the NLRA provides employees with the right not to participate in umons.11 8 Thus, threats of violence and other pressure
applied by two or more union members to coerce non-umon
employees into supporting union goals could fall within the
literal proscription of the Conspiracy Statute. At the same time,
such union conduct would violate section 8(b)(1) of-the NLRA.' 1 9

See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
,, See Ennons, 410 U.S. at 411.
'" 491 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 210.
116Id. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 241, see infra note 117.
117 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having to exercise the same;
"2

They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.
Id.
jig See supra note 31.
11929 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982), added by the Labor Management Relations Act
in 1947, forbids unions from violating this right. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor .organization or its
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The DeLaurentis court, partially relying on Enmons, held
that the rights specified in section 7 of the NLRA may only be
vindicated by the NLRB.120 The court recognized that Congress
2
did not envision criminal penalties for violations of the NLRA.1 1
In fact, the legislative history of the NLRA indicates that Congress specifically decided not to allow civil damage suits for
violations of NLRA rights.'2 Citing this legislative history, the
DeLaurentiscourt held, "[i]t seems unlikely that a Congress that
was not prepared to allow civil damage suits in these circumstances intended the same conduct to constitute a federal crime
pumshable by up to ten years m jail and a heavy fine."' 23 The
court also noted that Congress had expressly provided a civil
cause of action against umons who engaged in secondary boycotts.'2 This indicated that Congress knew how to provide civil
actions when it saw the need. 25 Therefore, the court concluded
"that Congress would not silently import sweeping criminal li' 26
ability into the regulation of labor relations.' 2
These cases illustrate judicial respect for Congress' decision
to vest the NLRB with exclusive jurisdiction over NLRA violations. 27 The remedial, non-punitive structure of the NLRA and

agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title
or (B) an employer in the
selection of his representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances.
Id.
120DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d at 211.
"I Id. at 213.
See id.
:23 DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d at 213.
See 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982) (This statute provides a cause of action for damages
in federal district court for violations of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982). Normally violations
of section 158 are exclusively remedied by the NLRB. This statute is an exception to the
NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims.).
'- See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982) (prohibiting labor organizations from pressuring
neutral business entities, with whom the labor organizations have no dispute, from doing
business with the employer from whom the labor organization is attempting to force
concessions); see, e.g., National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967)
(union pressure intended to influence secondary employer into terminating business
relationship with primary employer is prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)).
126 DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d at 214.
"2 See, e.g., id. at 213 ("Courts, in a variety of ways, have emphasized that
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its lack of civil or criminal penalties make the application of
federal criminal statutes questionable. 128 The exclusivity of the
NLRB's jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor practices was recognized in DeLaurentis even though another federal statute arguably applied. 29 The same type of analysis and the same
deference to congressional intent are relevant when courts at30
tempt to reconcile RICO with the NLRA.
B.

RICO and the NLRA

The cases that follow address more specifically the extent to
which RICO should apply to labor-management disputes in light
of congressional intent that the NLRB have exclusive jurisdiction
to remedy violations of the NLRA.13 ' These cases illustrate the
relevant competing considerations in ascertaining whether conduct constituting an unfair labor practice may also serve as a
predicate act for RICO
1.

United States v Thordarson

In 1980, the Ninth Circuit was presented with the issue of
whether several federal crimes, including RICO, should be applied to violent activity arising out of a labor dispute. In United
States v Thordarson,32 employees of a storage company elected
the Teamsters Union as their collective bargaining representative.
The company refused to recognize the union and the employees
called a strike. During this strike, the company lost several of
its trucks because of union violence. 33
An indictment was filed in federal district court alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. section 844(i),' 34 18 U.S.C. section

enforcement of rights under the Labor Act is entrusted exclusively to the Labor Board
as an expert adminstrative agency.
").
"2 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
,19
See id; see also Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,
374-78 (1979) (providing a similar analysis of two conflicting federal statutes and the
suggested resolution).
,, See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
,' See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
132 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1980).
113 Id.
at 1325.
"4 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1982) provides: "Whoever maliciously damages or destroys,
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1952' 11 and RICO I36 The district court, relying on Enmons,
dismissed all of the charges. 3 7
The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the trial court and held
that RICO, and the other federal statutes, applied to violent acts
occurring during a labor dispute. 38 In so doing, it "read Enmons
as holding only that the use of violence to secure legitimate
collective bargaining objectives is beyond the reach of the Hobbs
39
Act."1

or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or
other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity
affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned
or fined
or both."
'" 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent
to
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity;
or (3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful
activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts
specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined
or imprisoned
or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has
not been paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws
of the State in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2)
extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which
committed or of the United States.
Id.
36 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
conspire to violate any of the [substantive] provisions
of this section." See supra
notes 85-91.
23 See United States v. Thordarson, 487 F Supp. 991, 995 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
Acts of violence, such as the ones alleged in the instant case, occurring
during a lawful labor dispute and resulting in damage to persons or
property are punishable under state law. However, there is nothing in the
language or history of § 1952 to 'justify the conclusion that Congress
intended [§ 1952] to work such an extraordinary change in Federal labor
law or such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of
the States.
Id. (quoting Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411).
"I Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1337.
"9 Id. at 1327.
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The Ninth Circuit held that Enmons was based on a reading
of the Hobbs Act's "unique legislative history,"' 4 which contained a statement from its author saying the Act absolutely did
not apply to strikes.' 4' The court claimed that nothing in the
federal criminal statutes in question here indicated that they
were not meant to apply to labor violence. 42 The statutes, including RICO, were "written in general terms and make criminal
the prescribed conduct without regard to the status or ultimate

objectives of the person engaging in

it.'

1 43

In Enmons, the Supreme Court expressed the fear that the
application of federal criminal statutes to labor disputes would
transform relatively minor acts into federal crimes and place the
federal government into the business of policing labor-management relations.'4 The Thordarson court, however, discounted
the import of the Supreme Court's fears, saying "[t]he destruction of vehicles used in interstate commerce by means of explosives and travel in interstate commerce to commit arson are
hardly the sorts of minor picket line violence that the Enmons
Court feared would be transformed into federal crimes under
1 45
the Hobbs Act.'
At least two premises of the Thordarson court's analysis are
problematic. 46 First, the court looked to the wording of the
statutes and their legislative histories and failed to find an intent
to exclude these laws from applying to labor disputes. 47 In
Enmons, however, the Supreme Court focused on Congressional
silence concermng the application of the Hobbs Act to labor
disputes and concluded that absent clear congressional intent to
the contrary, the remedial scheme set out in the NLRA should

1330 n.12.
See Enmons, 410 U.S. at 405-06 (quoting 89 CoNc. REc. 3213 (1943)).
Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1327.

'4°Id. at
14

141

Id. at 1328.

Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411.
,,1 Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1329.
1,6 This Note does not address the Thordarson opinion as it applies to 18
U.S.C. §
844(i), the explosive charge. This Note is concerned with the proper extent to which
RICO may convert conduct which previously only constituted an unfair labor practice
under the NLRA into a federal crime. The "explosives act" pertains to conduct which
is illegal independent of the labor law context. Thus, the argument that the statute
should not apply to labor disputes is not advanced here.
"' Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1327
11
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not be altered.148 In other words, where Congress is silent, the
presumption is that a subsequent enactment should not apply to
labor disputes. The Supreme Court stated:
[I]t would require statutory language much more explicit than
that before us here to lead to the conclusion that Congress
intended to put the Federal Government in the business of
policing the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the language
of the Hobbs Act nor its legislative history can justify the
conclusion that Congress intended to work such an extraordinary change in federal labor law or such an unprecedented
149
incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the States.
Second, the Thordarson court focused on the seriousness of the
crimes committed and found Enmons limited to preventing relatively minor crimes from falling within the Hobbs Act. 150 However, the extortionate acts in Enmons were not minor, and
included the destruction of a transformer substation.' 5'
The rule of Enmons was based on the potential for applying
the Hobbs Act to relatively minor acts of violence occurring
during a labor dispute. 15 2 The Supreme Court explicitly refused
to accept the argument that the Hobbs Act should be applied to
"serious" acts of violence while carving out an exception for
"mischievious" conduct. 5 3 Thus, the decision of the Ninth Circuit, which seems to adopt such an approach, is at odds with
Enmons. The distinctions propounded by the Ninth Circuit in
Thordarson are not sufficient to support this deviation from
Enmons.

"4 Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411.
'

'"

Id.

Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1329.
See Enmons, 410 U.S. at 398.
Id.

at 410 n.20.

,' Id. at 410 n.20. At this point, it is important to note that the Thordarsoncourt's
analysis as it related to the "federal crimes" predicate acts contained in 18 U.S.C. §
1961(l) may have been at odds with Enmons. However, in the RICO context, that
problem (the potential of federalizing rather mnor crimes occurring in the labor context)
can best be handled by not allowing those Enmons-type federal crimes to serve as
predicate acts if they do not exist independent of the NLRA. The danger of RICO
federalizing relatively minor crimes, however, is small since the state law predicate acts
included in the statute are all major cnmes (e.g., arson, murder, etc.). See 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1) (1982).
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United States v Boffa

In 1982, the Third Circuit utilized a contrary approach in
determining the proper application of the federal mail fraud
statute 54 and RICO'55 to conduct arising out of a labor dispute.
In United States v Boffa,156 however, it was not the union that
was indicted for a RICO violation, but rather the head of a
57
labor leasing orgamzation.1
The indictment alleged that as a result of a "labor switch,"
which terminated one employee leasing contract and substituted
another group of leased employees, 58 the former union employ-

1- 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authonzed
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by- mail according to
the direcion thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered
by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more that five years, or
both.
Id.
For relevent text of RICO, see supra notes 85, 88, 90, and 136.
1' 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982).
"7 See id. at 923. While RICO was part of the indictment, the main thrust of the
opinion focuses on mail fraud.
S Id. The facts of Boffa were as follows:
Between 1971 and 1977, Universal Coordinators, Inc. (UCI), a New Jersey
Corporation controlled by Eugene Boffa, Sr. leased truck drivers to Inland's Newark facility. These drivers were represented by the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
American (Teamsters) Local 326, headed by co-defendant Francis Sheeran.
Concerned about recurring labor disputes at the Inland plant, appellant
Eugene Boffa, Sr. and Sheeran agreed that after the election of officers of
Local 326 in November, 1976, Boffa would terminate the leasing contract
between UCI and Inland and substitute for UCI a second leasing company
controlled by the enterprise. The purpose of the switch was to "cause the
employees of UCI
to be fired and not rehired by the second leasing
company."
155

The indictment charges appellant Robert Boffa, Sr. with nine mail fraud
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ees were deprived both of their statutory collective bargaining
rights under section 7159 of the NLRA and the contractual rights
contained in their collective bargaining agreement.16° The former
union employees alleged this "labor switch" was accomplished
by a pattern of racketeering activity 161 The defendants contended

that the labor switches were at most unfair labor practices and
not federal crimes. 162
As to the statutory rights, the court analyzed the legislative

history of the NLRA to determine if Congress intended for a
deprivation of such rights to be remedied by another federal
statute.163 The court concluded "[a]s a matter of statutory con-

struction, we are unwilling to sanction mail fraud prosecutions
for schemes to deprive individuals of a particular intangible right
when such a prosecution would contravene the intent of the
Congress that created that right." 164 In other words, when Congress created the statutory right to bargain collectively, it intended for violations of that right to be remedied exclusively by
the NLRB, 165 and the Boffa court found nothing to indicate that
Congress intended to create new remedies by enacting the Mall
Fraud Statute or RICO 16
The remedial, non-punitive nature of the NLRA was persuasive to the court. It noted that NLRA did not provide crimi-

nal penalties for unfair labor practices.1 67 The overall scheme
of the NLRA suggests that Congress did not intend to create

violations in connection with a similar labor switch at the Van Wert, Ohio
The alleged purpose of this
facility of Continental Can Corporation.
switch was to enable CWP to obtain higher fees from Continental Can
than had been paid to UCI, which paying less to Teamsters Local 908
drivers.
Id. at 923-24.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). For the text of the statute, see supra note 31.
159
160

Boffa, 688 F.2d at 923.

16

Id.

16

Id. at 925.

161

Id. at 926.

Id., cf. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 442 U.S. at 366, 372-76 (Deprivation
of a nght created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. may not be remedied by a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which
prohibits conspiracies to depnve persons of federal rights; instead, the right must be
remedied as provided in the statute which created it.).
"6 Boffa, 688 F.2d at 927
64

'6,
167

Id. at 928.
Id.
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new criminal sanctions for violations of employees' section 7
rights.' 6 "[T]he absence of any criminal sanctions in section 8
of the NLRA suggests that Congress did not contemplate that
employers would be subject to criminal liability even by operation of another statute, as a result of comnttmg an unfair
labor practice."' 69
The NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor disputes
was also paramount in the court's decision. 7 0 The court recogmzed the importance of the policy behind the NLRA of having
an expert administrative body develop national labor policy 171
In Boffa, the jury would have been required to determine whether
the object of the defendants' scheme constituted an unfair labor
practice, which is "precisely the type of statutory question that
Congress intended only the [NLRB] to resolve." 7 2
The Boffa court held, however, that the deprivation of employees' contractual rights, as provided by their collective bargaining agreement, was the type of injury to which the Mail
Fraud Statute, a RICO predicate act, 71 could apply 174 The court
reasoned that applying the Mail Fraud Statute to a deprivation
of contractual economic rights does not require any interpretation of the NLRA. 75 The contract between the parties created
these rights, not the NLRA. 76 Therefore, the court refused "to
accept the proposition that the NLRA precludes the enforcement
of a federal statute that independently proscribes that conduct
1 77
as well.'
It is important to notice the Boffa court's comparison of the
NLRA and the Mail Fraud Statute. The Mail Fraud Statute was
in existence prior to the enactment of the NLRA,' 78 and the

169

Id.

169 Id.

Id. at 929.
Id., see also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 278-80 (1971)
(In the context of a "preemption" case the Supreme Court recogmzed the importance
of having an expert administrative body form national labor policy.).
'72 Boffa, 688 F.2d at 929.
" See supra notes 85-87.
17
Boffa, 688 F.2d at 930.
"'

175
176

7
178

Id.
Id.
Id. at 931.

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). This statute was enacted in 1909.
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court considered the question to be whether the NLRA was an
implied repeal of the Mail Fraud Statute in the context of labor
disputes. 79 The court held it was not, stressing the Supreme
Court's distaste for implied repeals. 80 RICO, however, was enacted after the NLRA. l8 ' Thus, the focus of statutory interpretation should be whether, in light of congressional intent for the
NLRB to have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the NLRA,
RICO worked an implied repeal of the NLRA-thereby allowing

criminal and/or civil sanctions for the same conduct when it can
182
be framed as a RICO violation.
The Boffa court, while generally upholding the validity of a
RICO cause of action against the defendants, 83 did not specifically focus its analysis on the interplay between the RICO statute
and the relevant provisions of the NLRA.8 4 The court concluded
that Mail Fraudprosecutions could lie if contractual rights were
taken 8 5 and, since a Mail Fraud violation constitutes a predicate
act under RICO, 86 RICO could also apply 187 Simply because a
Mail Fraud prosecution is proper under the Boffa analysis,
however, does not necessarily mean that the existence of Mail
Fraud-type conduct justifies the application of RICO to the same
facts. 188

"I See

Boffa, 688 F.2d at 932-33.
1 Id. "The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the strong judicial policy
against implied repeals." Id. at 932.
' See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982) (the NLRA was enacted in 1935); 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1982) (RICO was enacted as part of the Orgamzed Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)).
" Since the NLRB never had exclusive jurisdiction over all claims that could also
be couched in terms of an unfair labor practice, no "implied repeal" is necessary where
RICO applies independently of the NLRA. See, e.g., UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S.
634, 644 (1958), rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958) (employee may sue union for
malicious interference with lawful occupation regardless of the fact that NLRA § 8(b)
may make the union's conduct an unfair labor practice as well).
See Boffa, 688 F.2d at 934-39.
"' See, e.g., id. at 927. "We must determine whether a scheme to depnve employees
of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA is within the ambit of the mail fraud
statute. This determination requires an examination of the congressional policies underlying the NLRA." Id.
Id. at 926-27; see supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 85.
Boffa, 688 F.2d at 930-32.
,B See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
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18 U.S.C. section 1961(1) states that "any act which is
indictable under [18 U.S.C. section 1341 (mail fraud)]" may
serve as a predicate act.18 9 This section defines racketeering activities by incorporating by reference other types of conduct. 19°
This distinction is important because the Boffa court implicitly
assumed that because certain conduct in the labor law context
could constitute a Mail Fraud violation, and RICO incorporated
Mail Fraud-type conduct as a "racketeering activity," that it
necessarily followed that RICO should apply to a labor dispute
where a Mail Fraud prosecution could apply 191
As stated above, part of the Boffa court's rationale for
allowing the Mail Fraud prosecution in a labor dispute was the
Supreme Court's distaste for implied repeals. 192 Despite the questionable validity of the Boffa court's "implied repeal" analysis,
the rule the court created is consistent with Enmons.193 The Boffa
decision stands for the proposition that if a crime may be proven
pursuant to a pre-existing federal statute, without reference to
the NLRA, then there is no encroachment on the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction. 194 Even though the Boffa court never mentioned Enmons, the rule it created is consistent with that
opinion. 195 The determining factor in both Enmons and Boffa
was preventing federal criminal statutes from being applied to
conduct that would otherwise only constitute an unfair labor
practice.196
3.

Butcher's Union v SDC Investment, Inc.

A subsequent federal district court opinion used the "implied
repeal" analysis in the context of a civil RICO suit, specifically
19918 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) (This section of RICO defines "racketeering activi-

ties.").
190See supra note 86.
"I See Boffa, 688 F.2d at 927.
"9 See supra notes 178-82 and accompahying text.
"I See, e.g., Enmons, 410 U.S. at 400 (Whether the obtaimng of property in
Enmons was "wrongful" could only be determined by making reference to the NLRA.
Thus, the Court held the Hobbs Act should not apply where violence is used to obtain
potentially legitimate union objectives.).
"'
See Boffa, 688 F.2d at 931-32.
,' See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.

See Enmons, 410 U.S. at 400; Boffa, 688 F.2d at 929 (the Boffa court holding
that deprivations of employees' NLRA § 7 rights should only constitute unfair labor
practices and not mail fraud violations).

1987-881

NLRB JURISDICTION AND RICO

recognizing that RICO was enacted after the NLRA. In Butcher's Union v SDC Investment, Inc. 197 a umon filed a civil RICO
claim' 19 against an employer for recognizing another union to
avoid dealing with the plaintiff-umon as a collective bargaining
agent. 199 Illegal payments to the recognized union were allegedly
2
used to accomplish this result. 00
Such conduct would clearly constitute an unfair labor practice, 20 ' but the plaintiffs chose to file a civil RICO action. The
illegal payments and federal wire and mail fraud statute violations served as the predicate acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity 202 Thus, by skillful pleading, the plaintiffs were
20 1
able to seek treble damages for their alleged injuries.
The defendants in Butcher's Union made the predictable
argument that the plaintiff-union was attempting to circumvent
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB by bringing what is
essentially an unfair labor practice claim in federal district court
in the form of a RICO violation. 20 The defendants argued that
since the adjudication of the civil RICO claim would require the

court to resolve issues within the exclusive 1jurisdiction of the
5
NLRB, the RICO complaint should be dismissed. 20

"9

631 F Supp. 1001 (E.D. Cal. 1986).

98 See supra note 90.

Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1002.
20 Id. at 1003. Such conduct clearly violates 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(I), which is one
of the predicate acts enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). See supra note 85. 29 U.S.C.
§ 186 provides in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer or association
of employers
to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money
or other thing of value-(l) to any representative of any of his employees who are
employed in an industry affecting commerce[.]" Id.
21
Employers are forbidden from contributing financial support to labor organizations by 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). Such conduct also constitutes a violation of 29 U.S.C.

§ 186.

202 Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1004.
203 Id., see supra note 90.
20,Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1005.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs' purported injuries result from three
acts: (1) the unlawful recognition of NMV by SDC; (2) the execution of a
contract with NMV- and (3) the alleged failure to SDC to hire members
of local 498. As such, defendants argue, they amount to unfair labor
practices prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and are
subject to the exclusive junsdiction of the NLRB.
Id.
.. Id.
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The court recognized that Congress had created, through
civil RICO, an additional independent remedy for conduct that
traditionally was remediable only by an unfair labor practice
claim. 20 6 The court discussed two other statutory exceptions to
the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction which would allow a plaintiff
to bring suit in federal district courts, sections 301 and 303 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 2° These sections
illustrate that Congress has created statutory remedies in addition
to those provided in the NLRA. 20 1 In the words of the Butcher's
Union court, "Congress gets to make the rules-and change
them. Congress could, and did, create the NLRB as the exclusive
forum for consideration of certain conduct, but can and does
create exceptions to that exclusivity "2 Thus, the issue is whether
Congress intended RICO to be another exception to the NLRB's
exclusive jurisdiction.
First, the court analyzed the illegal payment claims, concluding that the plain wording of the RICO statute made such
Id. at 1007. "[W]here Congress has provided remedies for proscribed conduct
independent of those available in an NLRB proceeding, the preemption doctrine has no
application." Id., see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-83 (1967) (preemption rule
inapplicable where activity regulated was merely peripheral concern of the LMRA).
207 Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1005-07 Section 301 of the LMRA is codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
Section 303 of the LMRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982), which provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful
in an industry or activity affecting commerce,
for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as
an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title.
(b)Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or [sic]
any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue thereafter in any
district court of the United States
without respect to the amount in
controvery, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parites, and
shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
Id.
20, Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1006; see, e.g., International Longshoremen's
& Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1952) (Supreme
Court allowed civil action to lie for violation of LMRA § 303 even though the conduct
fell within the proscription of NLRA § 8(b)(4)).
209 Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1007.

NLRB JURISDICTION AND RICO

1987-88]

violations predicate acts, which could constitute a pattern of
racketeering activity 210 This approach is consistent with the "implied repeal" analysis used in Boffa.211 Here, however, the court
analyzed the extent to which RICO is an implied repeal of the
NLRA, instead of the extent to which the NLRA is an implied
212
repeal of the federal Mail Fraud Statute.
The court found it "hard to imagine that Congress would
have made § 186 a RICO predicate act without the intention of
making violations of § 186, which necessarily arise in the labor
context, the basis of a RICO action brought in the district
court. "213 The court deemed irrelevant the mere fact that such
actions might also constitute an unfair labor practice. 2 4 Thus,
Congress expressly created a new remedy for this type of unfair
2 5labor practice.
To the extent the pattern of racketeering activity was based
on conduct violating the federal mail2 6 and wire fraud statutes, 21 7
however, the RICO claim was not allowed. 218 The court held
that RICO's general reference to mail and wire fraud violations
as predicate acts was insufficient to overcome the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction in remedying violations of the NLRA. 2 9 To
the Butcher's Union court, the specific inclusion of conduct
violating section 186 as a predicate act was powerful evidence

210

Id.

211 See

supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.

212 See Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1007.
213 Id. The court went on to discuss the legislative ustory of RICO which indicated
that Congress intended to prevent organized crime from infiltrating labor unions by
making payments to union leaders. Thus, it made a violation of § 186 a RICO predicate
act. Id. at 1008.

214 Id.
21SId.

at 1009.

216 18

U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). For the text of this statute, see supra note 154.
at § 1343. The statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or impnsoned not more than five years, or both.

217 Id.

Id.

21' Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1009.
219 Id.
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of congressional intent to have all other labor law violations
remain outside the ambit of RICO = The focus is on whether
the description of the type of conduct included in the list of
RICO predicate acts is sufficiently specific to reference laborrelated conduct. If not, RICO, due to its.generality, can not be
read as an implied repeal of the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRB to remedy unfair labor practices.22 1
If this analysis is accurate, then RICO can never apply to
cases in which the alleged pattern of racketeering activity also
constitutes an unfair -labor practice.'m This rule exceeds the
Enmons/Boffa framework and goes beyond what is required to
protect the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor prac-

tices .223
Perhaps in recognition of the extremity of this rule, the
Butcher's Union court posited an alternative rationale for its
decision, holding that the wire and mail fraud violations could
not serve as predicate acts for a RICO claim if such violations
would not exist but for the NLRA. 224 In other words, the court
applied the same rule as the Boffa court, 25 saying:
In essence, the defendants' use of the mails or wire is an
indictable offense only where its purpose is the execution of a
fraud. Whether the conduct constitutes a fraud is defined
elsewhere by the law Under the instant complaint, this configuration is crucial since, under plaintiffs' allegations, the only
reason defendants' conduct can be alleged to be unlawful is
that it is denounced by labor law 226
To accept the Butcher's Union court's conclusion that a
RICO claim may not be brought if the alleged pattern of racketeering activity also constitutes an unfair labor practice, 227 it is

Id.
See id.
m Since LMRA § 302 (29 U.S.C. § 186) is the only labor law violation specifically
referenced in RICO's predicate acts, no other conduct constituting an unfair labor
practice could be the basis of a RICO violation. See supra note 85.
2n See supra notes 103-13, 139-96 and accompanying text.
224 Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. 1010-11. The court described this rationale as
"more persuasive." Id.
22
See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
226 Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1011.
227 See supra notes 204-22 and accompanying text.
2M
22
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necessary to insert a missing premise into the argument. The
missing premise is that the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over
unfair labor practice claims preempts any other cause of action
based on the same facts. 228 However, this has never been the
case. For example, an employer who assaults his union employee
to discourage him from exercising his NLRA rights would be
committing an unfair labor practice. 229 Such conduct would also
give rise to state criunal and tort claims2 0 Simply because
conduct may constitute an unfair labor practice does not immunize the perpetrator from liability under any other law 231 The
court's alternative rationale is more consistent with the previously discussed cases and provides a more reasonable means of
reconciling any tensions between the NLRA and RICO
4.

Local 355, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant & Hi-Rise Employees
v Pier 66 Co.

While it is clear that the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction does
not immunize a defendant from all liability resulting from the
violation of other laws, 232 one federal district court has taken
the position that any fact pattern giving rise to an unfair labor
practice may not be the basis of a RICO claim, regardless of
whether proving the RICO claim would require a NLRA determination. In Local 355, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant & Hi-Rise
Employees v Pier 66 Co., 233 the court refused to allow a civil
RICO suit because to do so would provide a plaintiff with a
means of circumventing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.2 4
In Pier 66, the union alleged that the company engaged in a
pattern of racketeering activity by offering its employees monetary inducements to file a decertification petition with the

z

See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(I) (1982).
See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
21 Id. See UA W-CIO, 356 U.S. at 640-42 (conduct constituting unfair labor practice
2"

also gave rise to state tort liability for malicious interference with lawful occupation).
"2 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.

21 599 F Supp. 761 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
2 Id. at 764.
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section 302 of
NLRB.2 5 Such conduct, if proven, would violate
23 7
the LMRA, 236 as well as the RICO statute.
The court found that the umon was "attempting to bring its

claims under the guise of various federal criminal statutes
to circumvent the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. ' 23 8 The Pier 66 court ruled that even though the
RICO statute explicitly provides that violations of LMRA section
302 constitute RICO predicate acts, 239 such payments would also
violate employee rights under the NLRA 24 and therefore come
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.24 1 As the court
put it: "[c]ontinued litigation of this matter would be tantamount to providing the Union with a means of circumventing
unfavorable decisions by the NLRB regarding its unfair labor

practice claims. This court, therefore, will defer to the expertise
'242

of the NLRB.
While the court's recognition of the need to limit the application of civil RICO to labor disputes is consistent with the
Enmons/Boffa policies of preserving the integrity of the NLRB,2 3
its rule goes beyond what those cases require. First, the court
treated the dispute as involving a preemption issue as opposed
to a conflict of federal statutes. 2 4 This is erroneous because
preemption only determines the extent to which a federal statu-

2' Id. at 762. Such a petition would require the NLRB to conduct an election to
determine if bargaining unit employees still desire to have the union as their collective
bargaining agent. See R. GoaAN, supra note 2, at § 6.
2'
29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(3) (1982) (prohibiting illegal payments to umons).
23
18 U.S.C. § 1961(l) (1982). Violation of this statute constitutes a "predicate
act" for a RICO violation. See supra note 85.
21, Pier 66, 599 F Supp. at
763.
39 Id., see supra note 85.
-4 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). This is often called a "residuary violation" of the
NLRA, since any abridgement of § 7 employee rights by an employer constitutes a
violation of § 8(a)(1).
241 Pier 66, 599 F Supp. at 763.
2 Id. at 764.
243 See supra notes 103-13, 139-96 and accompanying text.
244 See Pier 66, 599 F Supp. at 768.
The NLRB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine what is or is
[F]ederal courts do not have jurisdiction
not an unfair labor practice
over activity which 'is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], and
they 'must deter [sic] to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board.
Id. (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83 (1982)).
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tory scheme precludes state laws covering the same subject matter.245 Even if Congress in 1935 meant for the NLRA to preempt
the field of labor law totally, a subsequent federal statute may

amend that exclusivity

246

CONCLUSION

The issue, simply stated, is to what extent RICO alters the
remedial scheme of the NLRA in labor dispute applications.
Resolving the issue requires focusing on the type of conduct
claimed to constitute the requisite "pattern of racketeering activity" and making two determinations. First, whether there is
any conflict with the NLRA and second, if so, whether RICO's
description of the conduct is sufficiently specific to evidence a
congressional intent to provide a new remedy247
First, contrary to the Pier 66 decision, the mere fact that the
conduct may constitute both a predicate act proscribed by RICO
and an unfair labor practice under the NLRA is not sufficient
to show that RICO should not apply 24s RICO should be limited
by the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRA only when the court
would be forced to determine whether some portion of the
defendant's conduct violated the NLRA as a condition precedent
to the existence of a RICO predicate act. 249 If that determination
is unnecessary, then RICO clearly applies. 2 0 For example, a
series of violent state law crimes constituting a pattern of racketeering activity might be a RICO violation. 251 However, depending on the objective to be achieved by this conduct, it might
also constitute an unfair labor practice. 252 If the predicate acts

241 Congressional authority to preempt a given area of the law is derived from the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
146 See Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. at 1006 ("Congress gets
to make the rulesand change them.").
'"
See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
u Id.
, See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
23
See United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 930-32 (3d Cir. 1982).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(i)(A) (1982). See supra note 85.
m For example, a series of violent acts by union members in order to "persuade"
non-union workers not to work dunng a prolonged strike could constitute a violation
of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (violating employees' right not to participate in union activity).
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exist independent of any judicial resolution of unfair labor prac25 3
tices, the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction is not violated.
When the existence of a RICO predicate act depends on the
resolution of an NLRA violation, then the question becomes
whether Congress, in enacting RICO, meant for some types of
unfair labor practices to also constitute predicate acts. 254 Since
this would be an exception to the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction,
the RICO statute must describe the conduct with sufficient specificity to evidence a congressional intent to modify the remedial
scheme of the NLRA. 2 5 This is exactly what Congress did when
it specifically made a violation of 29 U.S.C. section 186 a RICO
predicate act.25 6 While violating this statute is clearly a labor law
violation and an unfair labor practice, 257 it is also a type of
conduct Congress felt the need to bring within the proscription
of the RICO statute.2 8 Since Congress specifically included this
type of labor violation within the list of RICO predicate acts,
the inclusion of other more generic federal crimes as RICO
predicate acts was probably not intended to bring other unfair
labor practices outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRBY 9
Thus, where a pattern of racketeering activity may be shown
without reference to the NLRA, a RICO prosecution does not
violate the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the
Pier 66 decision, this is true even if the predicate acts also
constitute unfair labor practices. Should a court be required to
determine the existence of an unfair labor practice to resolve the
plaintiff's RICO claim, then the RICO statute must clearly describe that type of conduct as a predicate act in order to evidence
congressional intent to alter the-traditional remedial scheme of
the NLRA.
James Ellis Davis

See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
See Butcher's Union v. SDC Investment, Inc., 631 F Supp. 1001, 1007 (E.D.
Cal. 1986).
"
"

55Id.
256Id.

- See 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982).
-9 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C) (1982).
29 See Butcher's Union, 631 F Supp. 1001, 1009-10.

